I lost Joseph in Canaan
Joseph is found, Canaan is not
Yûnus
Ayrık is “separate from unity”. In terms of separateness, its inside and outside are not “one” and “unity”. In other words, in terms of the discrete’s separateness, its interior is one realm and its exterior is another realm. The discrete is also incomplete. One of the signs of this lack is the lack of “object”. The discrete is lacking in object. It is also driven to fulfill this lack. The lack of objects can be thought of as, for example, the object need of someone who is simply starving for food, or it can be thought of as the epistemological and ontological object need, which seems to be much more abstract and intellectual. In other words, studying objects in order to know is also an object need; doing “object metaphysics” or “object philosophy” in terms of questioning how we can call something an object is also an object need. Ayrık’s turning to another person for sexual fulfillment is also a need for an object, that is, a lack of object. In the case of self-gratification, it objects itself to itself; that is, the essence is the same. In terms of separateness, separateness is the primary cause of this lack. In this respect, lack is also a lack of the unity of inside and outside. In other words, it is not one inside and outside, and therefore, the disjointed does not have an object with “inside and outside”, “one inside and outside”. This is what is meant by the above expression “one realm inside and another outside”.
If we think of ‘discrete’ in a very broad sense here and understand that this includes everyone, no matter what profession or tradition, except those who are in the circle of unity, the breadth of the issue becomes clearer. We will continue from where we left off in the previous article by giving an example of a professional group that will also be useful in understanding the breadth of the issue. This professional group is called “philosophers”. However, due to space limitations, this article is an introduction to this point. Along with the previous articles and the introduction in this article, in the following article we will touch upon the chronologically accepted beginning of philosophy. In this context, we will discuss the archaists called philosophers, namely Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Parmenides, Puthagoras, Democritus and Aristotle in terms of the idea of “archa” and “object”. Thus, we will argue that philosophy, which is considered to have “begun” in terms of the aforementioned names, gave rise to the activity called “philosophy” under the impulse of the need for a “complete object”. In this regard, the picture that essentially supports this view is actually Aristotle’s picture in terms of the idea of “osuia”. In this context, we will touch upon other names in order to see Aristotle’s picture. We will also briefly mention Plato, in terms of “osuia” and in terms of “khora” as the reason for his disciple Aristotle’s fixation on the separation of “eidos and hule”.
It will be important to see that this group is made up of another kind of discrete, which is in some ways the same essence as the sexually and appetitively hungry discrete, which is in need of an object and is oriented towards the object in a broad sense, with the cause of the “missing object”, in order to understand what the discrete have been doing in history under the title of “philosophy”.
For the sake of simplicity, let’s take the matter from the obvious.
Many seemingly different pursuits and endeavors, such as food, goods, property, house, home, bar, spouse, partner, mount, tool, organization, adornment, marketing, etc., are essentially needs for completion in order to get rid of incompleteness. Seeking knowledge, or the knowledge of the object, is also a need for fulfillment to get rid of lack. For example, someone who seeks food is someone who needs to satisfy hunger. Someone who seeks knowledge of an object is someone who needs to fulfill the lack of a place that is specific to his knowledge. The one in need of food makes an effort to find the food he needs. A seeker of object knowledge also makes an effort to find the knowledge he needs. People in these endeavors are driven towards what is needed. The endeavor in which they both engage ends with the attainment of the need in question, and so the one under the drive settles down, feeling that he or she has gotten rid of the lack. However, when the deficiency is not removed in terms of the ground, the arousal and effort arise again. If the deficiency has been eliminated in terms of the ground, the arousal is replaced by tranquility.
The person searching for food is, in an external sense, looking for objects. In other words, what they want to obtain are objects in a broad sense (external objects). For example, bread, like milk. In this sense, we understand that someone in need of nourishment is, in a way, in a “search for objects” and, in the same sense, is in a “lack of objects.” However, this object in question, even if it is an external object, is not just a deficiency in external terms. What drives the needy person is also an internal deficiency, and in this essence, the need to complete and for this, the need to search for a “complete object.” So, in this sense, “object search” is not just a search for “external objects.” Object search is also a search for “internal objects.” For example, finding an apple as an external object due to the need for nourishment and eating the apple is not just a nutritional activity on the surface; eating the external apple is driven by the need to be completed through this apple in an internal sense, i.e., to be a “complete object” in a broad sense. In this sense, ‘Ayrık’ consumes the apple not only to satisfy its stomach but also to satisfy its other parts; for instance, its psyche, its consciousness, its mind, its imagination, its “vision.” In this sense, one needs to think of ‘Ayrık’ with all its parts as a broad, individual-specific topography. Moreover, ‘Ayrık’ often uses its stomach as an excuse. So, most of the time, what it actually wants to satiate is not its stomach, i.e., its body; it’s its other parts.
The same applies to the need for a home or shelter. Every part of ‘Ayrık’ in a broad sense wants to be secured or made comfortable. Therefore, turning towards an external object called “shelter” and the need to obtain it arises. Thus, it goes on the path of completing the deficiency, just as it does with food, in a broad sense, to be a “complete object.” We discussed this point in the articles titled “The Establishment of the World.”
The need for object knowledge is certainly not of the same nature as the need for “food for nourishment” or “shelter for refuge”; however, the foundation of ‘Ayrık’ is generally in “deficiency” caused by “separation.” This deficiency is a deficiency in a broad sense of the object. Therefore, every activity related to the broad sense of the “object” is also under the impetus of addressing this deficiency.
So, ‘Ayrık’ person not only turns to objects that are separate from them in spatial and temporal terms in an external sense and wants to acquire them, and in this sense, is in a “lack of objects,” but also turns to the “complete object” in a broad sense because they cannot be a “complete object” in themselves. They want to make themselves a “complete object” in this sense and are in a “lack of objects.” This second aspect is the primary aspect for ‘Ayrık,’ but most of the time, the first aspect mentioned above prevents the appearance of this aspect.
Thus, in this article, we simply divide the concept of “object” into two: external object and internal object. We also define the need for an object as “the need for a complete object,” encompassing both of them.
In this sense, the “complete object” can also be thought of as liberation from the internal and external distinction, or as reaching the “one and the same object” in some way, or as “coming into contact.”
To express the condition of being in need of an object that encompasses both aspects, we say that ‘Ayrık’ is in need of a “broad sense object.” In other words, we need to understand the need for an object in a broad sense, including external objects, internal objects, and the perception of a “complete object.”
The distinction between the inner world and the outer world separates ‘Ayrık’s objects into “external objects” and “internal objects.” In other words, the outer world, consisting of external objects, and the inner world, consisting of internal objects, are separated. In terms of the distinction between inner and outer scenes, what is meant by “discreteness” is the separation of the “world” and the “object” into “inner world and outer world.” In a broad sense, the need for an object also means the need for a “world formed as an inner and outer unity, i.e., an object.” In this sense, this world and this object in a broad sense are, in a way, “whole” with respect to discreteness, and the deficiency that needs to be understood is the deficiency of the world in terms of discrete worlds. In other words, what is ultimately lacking is the world of ‘Ayrık,’ which cannot be a “single world” due to the separation of inner and outer.
In this context, the complete object is essentially a “single world.” In different conditions and under different apparent pretexts, ‘Ayrık’ is essentially searching for a “single world.” Because, in this context, the “complete object” is a “single world.” ‘Ayrık,’ on the other hand, is two separate worlds; one is an inner realm, and the other is an outer realm.
For example, ‘Ayrık’ thinks within itself, creates dreams, sets goals, makes judgments, has desires or prohibitions; it has preferences, loves certain things, dislikes certain things, and hates certain things. However, in terms of its external world, it can hardly ever find a world that completely aligns with its inner states. The external world is rigid, while the inner world is driven by unstoppable desires. Therefore, the world, as the common ground of the inner and outer, becomes a “field of struggle and dispute.”
If we think about the distinction between the inner and outer worlds for each living ‘Ayrık,’ we see that the world is the “desired common world” of beings with an inner world(s) considered for each of them. In this sense, if we assume that the considered inner worlds are guided by desire, we understand that this world is the “desired common ‘outside’.” ‘Ayrık’ beings in this common external world essentially seek an external within themselves. What is actually sought is the ability to complete the deficiency within (i.e., the world that is lost due to the separation of inner and outer) by making it external. In this sense, what is sought in the world is actually “completeness”; in this context, it is the “complete object.” (We are not going into detail about the many pathological issues that need to be discussed here.)
However, the “complete object” is not something that can be obtained while being within the distinction of inner and outer perception, in short, within “discreteness.” Therefore, in this sense, it is impossible to fulfill the “need” of “discreet ‘Ayrık'” for the “perception of the complete object” while being discreet. And for this reason, “discreet ‘Ayrık'” is constantly provoked by the world. Being constantly provoked, it must resort to every means, every path.
Let’s further clarify the distinction between the inner and outer worlds.
Discrete individuals, in their inner world, think, classify, compose, transform, manipulate, revolve, change, fix, and turn one thing into another. In their external world, they move, hold, break, glue, stop, halt, and turn one thing into another. At first glance, it may seem like there is no discreteness. However, this is not the case. Even from the perspective of a very ordinary experience, the discreteness between the inner and outer worlds can become apparent, for example, when an internal understanding contradicts an external phenomenon, or when they negate each other. In other words, the inner understanding that contradicts an externally perceived phenomenon reveals that they are not the same. So, an external perception, essentially a phenomenon that cannot be internally established, when associated with an internal judgment, is not the same.
In this sense, negation is the “disruption of the completeness of the object subject to judgment.” It is the breaking of what is considered whole, and hence, the diminishment of the one who judges. For example, if we fundamentally negate Aristotle’s concept of “ousia,” we break it down and eliminate it. Thus, Aristotle has to rethink and search for the matter at hand.
Let’s provide another example. Consider an external object that can be sensed. Let’s think of a green apple. This green apple can disappear from perception by being eaten or rotting. However, the memory of the apple (in the form it was perceived at every stage of eating or rotting) does not disappear with the disappearance of the apple. In other words, the memory of the apple can persist even when the apple is no longer there. So, the external aspect of the apple as an object of perception and its aspect as remembered are subject to different principles. The same apple appears to be subject to different principles when it comes to perception and remembrance. In other words, the same apple has been divided into internal and external apples; it has become discrete. After this division, we realize that the principles specific to the external apple cannot achieve a full effect on the internal apple. For example, the physical conditions that affect the external apple cannot directly affect the internal apple, meaning that the physical world outside cannot be the “source” of the internal apple. Here, too, the conditions of the inner and outer have separated.
Let’s provide a slightly different example. Imagine a rectangular wooden table. ‘Ayrık’ breaks the rectangular wooden table and uses the material to create another shape, for instance, a triangular table. Now, let’s ask: Has ‘Ayrık’ actually touched the wooden material by breaking the rectangle and making a triangle? In other words, has ‘Ayrık’ broken the rectangle and made the triangle?
The answer is no.
Let’s explain.
In the example mentioned above, what ‘Ayrık’ breaks is not the geometric object “rectangle” itself, but only the wooden material. What he creates from this material is not the geometric object “triangle” itself, but only the wooden material. Breaking or composing wooden material does not break or compose a geometric object. In other words, for example, we cannot define the geometric object “rectangle” in terms of the wooden material in any way. A geometric object exists with its specific mathematical definition; it belongs to mathematics, not to wood or any other material. What is broken or composed here is only the wooden material. Geometric objects like “rectangle” and “triangle” are not subject to breaking or composing in this context.
These wooden tables, from the perspective of ‘Ayrık,’ are in the external world. However, the shapes that change due to the formation and decay of these tables are distinct from wooden material; even if it is not immediately noticed.
If ‘Ayrık’ carefully examines what he has done in this example, he will realize that wooden material and the essence of the geometric object are distinct. In other words, he will realize that the essence specific to wooden material is different from the essence specific to the geometric object, and he will understand that breaking or making by hand is based on “distinctness.”
In the example above, even though they are not subject to breaking or composing, from the perspective of ‘Ayrık’s’ perception, it should not be overlooked that what is destroyed and created through the decay of wooden material is “rectangle” and “triangle.” Let’s briefly explain this.
With this slightly different example, we see the meaning of discreteness from another angle: an object is discrete when it is not based on its specific foundation, meaning that it has been separated; therefore, it is deficient, meaning that it has been diminished. For example, in the example above, the foundation of the geometric object is not wooden material, and the foundation of wooden material is not the geometric object; therefore, these objects are discrete in terms of their foundations, and as long as they do not correspond to each other in terms of their foundations, their connection is deficient. ‘Ayrık,’ without providing unity in terms of the foundation of the geometric shape and wood, diminishes both by separating them. In other words, the unity provided in terms of discreteness is not “original unity.”
For instance, concerning the fact that objects in nature originate from their specific sources, we cannot say that their geometry is discrete from their materials. We have no basis for saying this. We cannot generalize the “dissection” of ‘Ayrık’ in the sense shown above to this issue. Therefore, we cannot say that objects in nature originate separately from their specific sources. The judgment given in the example mentioned above is only applicable to discrete individuals.
‘Ayrık’ separates and diminishes everything he touches, even though he believes and claims to unify and combine. However, ‘One’ and ‘Unity’ fundamentally unites and completes everything it touches, even though it may seem to separate or break in some cases.
So, the essence is whether the foundation is one and unity or separate and discrete.
‘Ayrık’ separates even by “seemingly” uniting. Therefore, it is constantly provoked, always confused, no matter how much it conceals.
A word of caution: one should not confuse the astonishment that leads to unity and is caused by unity with the astonishment that is based on ignorance and blindness. Let us continue.
The separation of the inner and outer, and the detachment of the object from its own ground, are the most significant obstacles to reaching the “complete object.” If we set aside the relative aspect of “complete” in terms of the subsequent emergence of deficiency, we can express this as “objectlessness.”
“In objectlessness,” as expressed in this context, is subsequent. In other words, it comes after the separation. Separation, in terms of its ground, is itself subsequent to unity; it is emergent. The terms “before and after” expressed here should not be understood as “temporal sequence of before and after.” We should understand them in terms of “conceptual sequence.” For example, we cannot think of the concept of “Ayrık” (distinct) before the concept of “unity.” We cannot think, “First, there was distinctness, then there was unity,” because that would be denying unity. Essentially, it would be nonsense in terms of the concept of “unity.” We would be denying it because we would be thinking of unity as something that emerged from the combination of distinct elements, and such a unity would be a false unity, as in the example given above with the “construction of a triangle.” We would be talking nonsense because unity cannot be understood as something that was created as a result of combining distinct elements. The object in the essence of unity is based on unity itself. Let’s continue.
What is established as subsequent to unity in the manner mentioned is the ground. In other words, the “transition” from unity to another ground is an act of creation, and it does not constitute the essence of unity.
First, let’s clarify this: conceptually, we think of the object along with its ground. We cannot think of an object without its ground. Otherwise, we cannot speak of the object. An object without a ground is like an “incomplete house.” An incomplete house does not exist. A wall cannot stand without support. An object is based on its specific ground.
However, the ground and the object cannot be thought of as being the same. Otherwise, we would need to think of a ground for the thing that is considered a ground for the object, which is absurd. The ground is the support for its specific object. Thinking that the support and the supported thing are the same means not mentioning the “support and the supported thing.” Therefore, as a support, the ground is different from the object it supports. In this regard, the existence of the object is based on a support that has a different nature. The difference between the object and the ground is a difference in nature.
An object has a beginning in terms of its ground. Therefore, it is subject to an end. What begins here is the object itself, along with its ground. In other words, the beginning is the object itself. In this sense, the object, in terms of its essence and its ground, is subject to a “limit.” That is, the object is both finite and limited. The specific ground for the object, however, is not subject to a limit or an end in the nature of the object. Because the nature of the object and its ground is not the same, the limit and end that are valid for the object in terms of its nature do not apply to the ground. We cannot determine the judgment about the nature of the ground based on the object it supports. However, the determination made on the object held above the ground is also valid for the ground in terms of its “limit,” that is, its determination, without expressing it as “the very determination.” Otherwise, we cannot relate the object to its ground. Due to the absence of “the very determination,” the mentioned determination is essentially “related” or “associated.”
These are general conceptual frameworks.
“Ayrık” (distinct) changes its ground by way of separation. Then, by means of differentiation, it separates and diminishes the object.
Therefore, objectlessness, in terms of the ground, is subsequent to separation.
The “distinct” that falls into objectlessness due to separation enters the need for an object. If it fulfills the need for an object, it hopes to complete itself. However, the reason for its objectlessness is its separation in terms of the ground. Therefore, even if it takes over the whole world, without destroying the ground it has created and returning, it cannot find tranquility or achieve its goal; it is unaware of this. Thus, “Ayrık” (distinct) falls into endless ignorance. Except for those whom my Lord has mercy on.
Now, we can bring the topic to those called philosophers.
1-The author uses the word “Ayrık” in the same sense as the term “Sapiens”.
