The Reality of the Name in the Existence Distinctions of Knowledge
“Yunus, your name is faithful, if you have come to this path,
Those who have not changed their names, have not come to this path”
Yunus Emre
In this article, we will explain the necessity of knowing the “noun” in order to know in the context of the knowledge of the universe, nature and the cosmos. In this context, it will be seen that knowledge of the universe is not knowledge of nature and the universe and is therefore insufficient. Inadequate knowledge is incomplete; incomplete knowledge is not knowledge. Therefore, knowing the universe does not constitute knowledge. The one who has no knowledge is in need of knowing. And to know, one needs a knower.
In this article, we have taken Yalçın Koç’s works titled “The Fundamentals of Theologia – An Examination of the Theories of Philosophy and Theology,” “The Fundamentals of Theographia – An Examination of Theology and Mathematical Construction,” “The Fundamentals of Theogonia – An Examination of Genesis Theories,” and “The Fundamentals of Nazar Logic – An Examination of Theologia Ir-rationalis,” as the center of our approach.
In this context, we would like to say the following: The books mentioned above were published about 10 years ago. The articles in the book titled “Anatolian Yeast – A Study on Turkish Identity” were published in Türkiye Günlüğü Magazine in 2006 and published as a book in 2007.
In many respects, the book titled “Anatolian Yeast” is a unique book in the history of the Republic and even earlier. The Nazariyat books written after this book are explicitly or implicitly contained in this book. The fact that the identity and the addressees of this book are different and wider is evident from the fact that it is dedicated to the “rose-faced martyrs of Anatolia”.
However, the books written after Anatolian May, some of which are mentioned above, address a more specific systematic conceptual framework and a limited circle of addressees. The topics, investigations and conclusions chosen for this circle are narrower in terms of Anatolian Maya, but address a wide and comprehensive circle in terms of the wider intellectual environment, including the current intellectual environment. The framework established in these books is more specific in terms of understanding what Koç thought is. As of today, these are the texts that should be taken into consideration and centered if one is to talk about a Koç thought.
Despite the author’s great attention to detail and power of expression, a solid way of preventing readers from reading “Anatolian Yeast” in a narrow or stereotypical way is to consult the author’s other books. In this respect, without reading and understanding the aforementioned books, it is not a valid approach to talk about understanding the thought of Koç.
Our studies are the products of an effort to touch both these texts and their source of origin to the extent of our own attention and understanding.
In the previous article, we conceptually divided the phrase “things in motion” into the universe, nature and the cosmos. We also said that this distinction was justified in terms of the movement and existence of each of them. Recall that the motion of the universe is the motion of becoming and decaying; the motion of nature is the motion of opening and closing; and the motion of the universe is the motion of connecting that which opens and that which closes; it is important to remember that this last motion appears conceptually indistinguishable in terms of what is thought to have occurred and its source.
Understanding the difference in the movement of creation depends on understanding the movement of opening and closing. At this point, what needs to be understood are the principles of relation that the source of the act of opening and closing establishes in that which opens.
Relationship is an Arabic word that comes into our language from Arabic; it is related to “neseb” and “nisbah”, which mean lineage, lineage, connection, affiliation, belonging, origin, genealogy, measure, calculation; what goes into nisbah also goes into “affiliation”. Generation and nisb requires thinking of one thing and another thing that is related to it. In this sense, nisb and neseb are categorically “two”.
There are two conditions for the bond of genealogy and nisbet: The existence of the relation between the nisb and the nisbed, and the course of the nisbed through the nisb. We cannot speak of nisb without something opening to the view of the one to whom it is related, and without these two things being present. We cannot talk about the measure of something without talking about the relation. Thus, something is open to measurement by entering into a relationship with something else and being compared accordingly. In this case, we see the thing by measuring it and know it in terms of measurement. In this sense, quantitative knowledge is subject to the principles of the concept of relation.
However, the formation of a relation is not a thing in itself. If correlation were a thing in itself, then it would require that what is related from those who enter into a relationship is the coming from its relation, and what comes from it is the common part of what comes from it; in this case, it would be necessary to say that what comes from it is the part that binds parts and whose parts are not diminished by binding parts, which is absurd.
This is because the idea of “a part that binds parts and whose parts are not diminished by binding parts” is contrary to the formation of the idea of parts. The essence of the idea of part has nothing to do with being a part, therefore. If it were, we would not be able to talk about “one” and “unity”, which should be the essence of the part.
Unity and one precede the part. Therefore, unity and the one are prior to the idea of the whole made up of parts and parts. Let us continue by briefly opening this wide-ranging issue with the example from the previous article about the idea of the “unit”.
The fragment is temporally similar to the “unit”. In the previous article, we briefly talked about the “unit.” We said that in the idea of the “unit,” the idea of “one” is not analytic, whereas without one, there can be no unit. The unit is a point in terms of what is lined up and arranged. This point cannot be removed from the record of “order and sequence”. In this case, the ultimate basis of the idea of sequence and unit must be something other than the “unit”. For the unit is under the record of the sequence, and the sequence is under the record of the formation of units, which means to think of circularity for both. Therefore, similarly, the basis of the idea of “unit” must be something other than the idea of sequence and order. For the “individuation” necessary for the “unit” is possible not by being in a sequence, but by remaining the same with itself.
It is impossible for that which does not remain the same as itself to become an individual; it is also impossible for the idea of sequence to emerge from that which remains the same as itself. Therefore, the idea of order can be based on a principle that makes it possible to remain the same with oneself and not to remain the same with oneself at the same time. This principle is the principle that makes the unit a unit, that is, the principle of “topography” that ensures the sameness of the unit in terms of its interior and the non-identity of the unit in terms of its exterior. Otherwise, it is not possible to talk about individualization and communalization on one and the same basis.
What needs to be understood here is that the unit is an exterior face and its interior is “one and unity”; the exterior face as a unit interacts with the other faces under a different principle of unity to form the interconnected field of existence. In both cases, the “principle of unity” is necessary, but it is impossible to ground the principle of unity itself either on the queue as a sentence of those who are in the queue, or on individuals as those who are in the queue but who are inwardly extraordinary. So to understand the principle of unity, it is not enough to be extraordinary.
In terms of the idea of topography, it becomes possible to unravel the principles of the unit and the part being a unit and a part. Topography, in Turkish, means “writing on the ground”. Topography, depending on the essence of the author, refers to the interrelatedness of different places and their inhabitants as constituting an existence specific to the place and its inhabitants. Without the idea of topography, one cannot speak of the individual, nor of substance, nor of essence, nor of subject. Without talking about these, one cannot talk about society, the accidental, the so-called and the objective, which are related to them.
Without the idea of topography, one cannot talk about the principles of mathematical objects. In this respect, topography is the essence that should be at the center of the “science of nature” and without knowing topography, one cannot speak of the “science of nature” in the true sense of the word.
One point should be noted here: The science of nature is made possible by the “theoretical ideas” based on topography, and by the theory itself, which essentially makes the navigation of nature possible; from this point of view, the works on Theory are also texts that show how the science of nature can actually be done. We will discuss this point in a separate article.
Everyone who works with the above-mentioned words and the like has an implicit or explicit conception of topography, even if it is unclear at first glance whether this conception is genuine or not.
From this point of view, the issue that needs to arise in order to understand what those who write in the fields of philosophy, theology and science say, for example, is the issue of making explicit the topographical conceptions of those who work with these words, and then evaluating whether these conceptions are correct or not. Without this, for example, neither Plato nor Aristotle, neither Descartes nor Spinoza, neither Kant nor Hume, neither Hegel nor Marx, neither Freud nor Jung, neither Frege nor Wittgenstein, nor others can be seen in their inner faces. The one who cannot see cannot be a muhakkik in matters related to them. Therefore, his judgment does not carry the value of a critical judgment. Let us return to the subject.
The existence of a relation requires the existence of another basis whose basis is not a relation. This basis makes it possible to understand the concept of the topographical individual as the basis for the existence of nisbet. This basis is the “non-relation”.
Non-relation is the realization that what comes comes with a coming without being able to watch what comes from itself in the coming. The movement that makes this comprehension possible is “birth” as “opening-closing”; that is, the coming of the thing by birth.
In terms of coming by birth, the relations formed by the act of opening-closing in the opening are divided into two: relative and non-relative. What is essential in this distinction is the non-relation. That is to say, none of the connections whose essence is relativity can be excluded from the record of non-relativity; any context that can be expressed in terms of relativity cannot be accepted as a self-subsistent, independent connection until a non-relativity essence is identified. Concepts of relativity that are in no way connected to non-relativity, on the other hand, cannot be accepted as real.
As a result of this distinction, the relationship in the movements within the concept of “coming and from which one comes” cannot encompass the concept of nature and implicitly the universe; on the contrary, for these relationships to exist, at least the concept of nature must already exist.
Understanding the idea of creation in this relation depends on understanding the relation that transcends the immaterial relation understood on the basis of birth. However, in terms of the irrelevance understood on the basis of birth, this relevance expresses an irrelevance. In other words, the idea of creation, in terms of the relations comprehended on the basis of origination, expresses the absence of any relation between the coming and the coming from. Therefore, being on the basis of birth is an obstacle to grasping creation. In order to comprehend creation, it is also necessary to leave the circle of birth.
Understanding the necessity of leaving the circle of birth begins with the realization that the existence on the basis of birth, that is, being, is incomplete.
The incompleteness, from the point of view of the beholder, appears with the identification of darkness; this much is enough for those who want to understand.
Knowing the sentence of things in the form of light, that is, knowing them in a way that is not dark at the same time, requires the beholding of things in the form of light. The beholding of things in the luminous form is through the manifestation of each thing and the appearance of this manifestation in the form.
The characterization takes place when the thing is framed in some way and the characteristics of what is in this frame are seen. We cannot watch something that is not framed, and we cannot talk about something that we cannot watch in terms of its characteristics.
For this, there must be a basis that makes things distinct.
This basis is the “name”.
In other words, by “frame” we understand the name of the thing, and by “property” we understand its attributes. Accordingly, the framing basis is the basis of observation.
Through the name, we distinguish things from each other and try to define things in terms of themselves. For example, we distinguish “camel from fish” by their names and define each according to their properties. In ordinary life, this happens spontaneously for individuals with language, that is, it happens without any help. We make distinctions about things such as “apple”, “basket”, “sea”, “human”, “bird”, “insect”, and assign names to them with these and similar words, and then we know them in terms of their characteristics and reason about them according to these names.
The reason for mentioning them is to remind the reader how central names and adjectives are to knowing and recognizing something in life, at whatever level it is. So to draw the reader’s attention to the issue of names and attributes.
By name and adjective we recognize things in terms of their frames and characteristics. However, this spontaneous use of name and adjective cannot prevent the beginning of an arduous journey if problems arise about whether things are known in terms of their names and adjectives, and what is the place and basis of name and adjective in the act of knowing.
These problems, in institutional chronological terms, lead to the journey that philosophy, theology and science should be based on; in individual terms, they lead to wisdom and the life that wisdom requires.
Let us distinguish two points here: Whether things are known in terms of their names and attributes, and what are the principles of knowing in terms of names and attributes in the act of knowing.
As regards the first, what is actually sought is what the real names and properties of things are. In existing disciplines, the search in this sense is considered the classical search.
In terms of the second, what is sought is how we know what we know as the subject in the act of knowing; in existing disciplines, this kind of search is considered modern.
In both cases, the crux of the quest is the conception of “logic” as a set of principles, and different logics or theories of logic are developed accordingly.
After all, there is no distinct quest that does not have its own logic identified. In other words, every quest that clarifies its problems and eliminates its deficiencies as much as possible, somehow constitutes its own logic; this is the front and back of the history of logic.
In this respect, it is significant that logic, in the first way, which is called classical, is based on “terms”. Thus, the names and attributes of things are sought to be known through the principles of logic.
The fact that the so-called modern logics, on the other hand, are based on propositions, the syntax of language and the structures of its functioning on a sequential basis is similarly significant in terms of the path taken.
The fact that the so-called classical logicians thought that things could be known in terms of logic was erroneously determined by the so-called modern logicians, who thought that things could only be known in terms of the knower’s own patterns of vision.
After this determination, it was thought that the knower’s own patterns of vision could not be grounded in terms of a “seer” in itself, and the “beholder and the beholder” were eliminated from this issue, and the work was brought to the search for logic without the beholder, the beheld and the beholding.
As a result, the current intellectual world, in such a quest, tries to “move” by claiming that it is somehow conducting the “science” of what it cannot watch. With the abundance of data and the increase in complex findings, this “blind” situation is being overlooked.
Here we have summarized the issue very briefly, from where we stand, so as to keep the reader’s attention on what is to be said next.
Knowing things and knowing the knower of things is a false distinction in terms of knowing the essentials. That is, the distinction between things and the knower of things cannot be recognized as an ultimate distinction if the essentials are known. Keeping the investigation on things also entails judgments about what the knower of things is; similarly, keeping the investigation on the knower of things entails judgments about what things are. Although narrowing the second path to the knower of things may seem to lead to some more precise and clear conclusions, these conclusions may also lead to some failures in terms of the “general judgments” that can be made about things. Indeed, when these judgments appear as a general syllogism in terms of an identifiable difference, some non-syllogistic principles that can be found for other things are rejected in advance. On the other hand, if one neglects to know oneself as a knower and seeks to know things, one may reject oneself in advance through “generalizing judgments” that are extended to the syllogistic knowers themselves or to oneself as a knower based on one’s superficial knowledge of things, without paying attention to the principles on which one knows things. In both cases, what needs to be considered is what are the principles of the sentence of things in general.
These principles should be applied both to the obvious things and to the individual as a thing itself. The extension of an essential diagnosis to the general, as a diagnosis of the non-essential aspect of the general, is a necessary condition for entering the circle of general rulings.
In any case, it is the principles that must be found. The one who finds the principles also finds the general provisions and thus finds his way into the circle of general provisions.
The one who finds and knows the general rulings knows everything, including the knowledge of the parts (juz’iyat) and the whole (külliyat).
If knowing the essentials is clarified by turning to the essentials of the thing to be known, the things to be known become clear.
Knowing the essentials means knowing things of a different nature from the thing that is based on the essentials, which can only stand on its own. Otherwise, we cannot call one thing a basis and another thing a grounded thing, that is, a foundation. This principle is general.
Knowing things by their names and attributes in ordinary life does not mean knowing the principles of names and attributes. Nor can it be considered a valid judgment to set aside the issue of names and attributes without knowing the principles of names and attributes.
In order to know the principles of names and attributes, it is necessary to ask about the ground that makes names and attributes possible.
In terms of ordinary practice, such a questioning of the ground is done by looking at what is done with these objects.
In ordinary practice, what is done with these objects is to analyze the sentence of things in terms of their names. Accordingly, reasoning is carried out by determining a set of judgments with things as subjects and things as predicates.
By “reasoning” here, we mean “reasoning” in the current “narrow intellectual environment”. If there were “reasoning” in this “environment”, we would not have to call it “reasoning”. Let us continue.
For this process, that is, for reasoning, the sentence of things must remain the same in terms of its names. A name that does not remain the same with itself does not make it possible to move from one place to another. At this point, remaining the same requires that things are not being watched in terms of their names. This is because the name’s being navigated in one moment requires that in the next moment the name is different from the previous moment. A name that is different in the previous moment and different in the next moment does not remain the same with itself. In this respect, it is necessary to say that the name has changed. In such a result, it would be impossible to move from one name to another name, that is, from one judgment to another judgment, and thus to the act of carrying out an idea.
For the execution of the idea, it is inevitable that the judgment has an aspect of sameness. The fact that this samiyyat is in terms of the name depends on the fact that the name is not being observed.
Because the moment before and the moment after are in a state of change.
The fact that the noun is actually unobserved necessitates that the adjectives are also unobserved. Because the adjective is in unity with the noun.
To think of adjectives without a noun is to think of quality without a frame. A quality without a frame is impossible in terms of idea-execution. For example, “angry” is either “angry dog”, or “angry oil”, or “angry iron”, or something similar; the fact that “angry” enters the spectacle depends on its being in unity with the noun that brings it into the spectacle, in terms of intellectualization. That is, the adjective or predicate is under the registration of the noun. The noun, on the other hand, is limited to the adjective or predicate in terms of idea.
We mentioned above that the noun does not travel in terms of remaining the same. In this respect, the adjective or predicate under the record of the noun similarly does not travel in terms of itself. If it did, the noun and adjective, which should have remained the same, would have changed in the next moment and would not have remained the same in the previous moment.
Here, the difference of the adjective from the noun for the two moments of navigation is that it is the element that makes possible the change to be navigated for both moments. However, for both moments, it is neither the noun nor the adjective that enters into the course itself. It is something else, as the unity of name and adjective, that enters into the course itself.
In other words, since the noun and adjective, especially the noun, cannot be observed in person, the other thing that is actually observed for the two moments is the proposition as the unity of these two at the same time, that is, the “simple proposition”.
The word “simple” in “simple proposition” is because it is based on different principles that transcend a part-whole relationship. It is simple because it is not inkeb.
It is not inkeb, that is, it is not formed by the composition of moments and ahkam related to moments. Therefore, its specific components are based on a different circle than the circle of composition.
For something simple, the part cannot be thought of; what can be thought of for the simple is the interior. We will write about this point later.
A proposition is a linguistic object that is in motion for both moments. Since it is in motion for both moments, the proposition is subject to change; what ensures sameness in change here is the noun in the proposition, and the adjective or predicate is an element of “comprehension” that connects the noun to the proposition.
For both moments, it is the proposition as a unity of noun and adjective that enters the spectacle, as in “red-hot iron”. We behold the proposition “red-hot iron”; that is, we behold “red-hot iron” in the proposition “red-hot iron”, but we cannot analyze either the red or the iron in “red-hot iron” without “red-hot iron”.
Similarly, “iron” is iron as a unity of noun and predicate. If we think of “iron”, we begin to envision a unity of noun and predicate(s) there. This is what is meant.
In this sense, a simple proposition is a “word” in terms of a language; in terms of itself, it is just a “simple proposition”. As a word in a language, a simple proposition is written, spoken and heard in a language. However, a simple proposition in itself belongs only to language, and can neither be written on paper, nor uttered in language, nor heard by ear.
However, it is important to note that it is the proposition, not the noun, that is being analyzed, even though it may appear that it is the noun or its adjective that is being analyzed.
Therefore, in “red-hot iron”, what we are analyzing is “red-hot iron”, not “iron in red-hot iron”, or “red-hot in red-hot iron”. In order to analyze these, we would have to watch the iron and the red-hot, that is, the noun and adjective substitutes. However, this is not possible in terms of establishing sameness, in the realm of opinion. The course of “iron” in ideation is the course of the propositional form about iron, and what makes sameness possible for two moments in this form is the name of iron.
Consequently, in ideation, we cannot watch the noun and the attribute. That is why the intellectual does not know the names and attributes of things. What it knows is only propositional, and what it knows propositionally is “incomplete” in terms of knowing what cognition by proposition is and what the name that appears propositionally is.
This conclusion indicates the general position of contemporary philosophical philosophies of language.
In language, we navigate the proposition. And within the proposition is the noun that makes possible the sameness of navigation; this noun, in conjunction with the adjective or predicate, makes possible the navigation of the proposition for “one moment” and for “every moment” in the next, ensuring the apprehension of things in language. This is all that needs to be understood in terms of navigation, in terms of language. In other words, understanding that name and attribute are not navigated in language is a sufficient step to understand the consequence of not seeing existence in terms of name and attribute in language, and to embark on a journey to search for the principles of name and attribute, and if so, to see whether existence actually has names and attributes, and then, if so, what they are.
The point to note here is where the name that makes sameness possible in language comes from.
The fact that the name is closed to navigation in order to make sameness possible in language is the most meaningful result at this point.
The individual on the basis of language is the individual as a unit, as mentioned above. In other words, individuals, on the basis of language, are connected to each other through language. In terms of this connection, the unit face of the individual is the proposition as a form. Here, “form” should also be taken to mean “face”.
The connection of the forms of propositions as units with each other, that is, their forming a whole out of parts, cannot be grounded in propositions as forms. We have explained this above in the issue of unit and part.
The sphere of existence constituted by the circle of forms as propositions, that is, individuals in this sense, is based on the principle that the form as a proposition remains the same as itself. This principle is the name that is internal to the proposition. What needs to be understood from this point of view is that the interiors of propositions as forms that ensure their sameness, that is, their internal elements, are their names.
Without clarifying the names of the forms of propositions as their inner faces, what the circle of these forms is and what each of them exists under the record of remains in the dark. In short, without investigating the names of the forms, the knowledge of the circle of forms is incomplete and obscure.
Moreover, finding the unique identities of the forms is only possible by finding their unique names.
If the name is not taken into consideration and the name is not addressed, the individual basis that makes the unit a unit is denied. And through this denial, the individual is destroyed and massified. This point is essential for finding freedom.
In terms of the institutional and individual quest, which we have briefly summarized above, we can express this situation as follows:
The attitude of classical quests in searching for names is closer to the truth than that of modern quests in terms of seeing what is both the part and the whole and what is beyond them; in fact, the meaningful attitude of modern quests, which cancels the name altogether, is the closest danger to beware of in terms of the obstacle it poses to the individual’s finding freedom. In this respect, modern pursuits, paths and procedures are the closest obstacles to freedom for the individuals who come into contact with them.
However, it is more important to understand the mistakes of classical pursuits, which also give rise to modern pursuits, in order to confront the real dangers.
At the forefront of this danger are two names that touch both the classics and the moderns as founders: Plato and Aristotle.
A careful study of these two thinkers is therefore crucial for understanding these issues on this scale, for grasping the state of the history of ideas.
From an individual point of view, these conclusions are important for illuminating many historical issues. Chief among these issues is “religion”.
Religion, from an individual point of view, is a matter of name, everywhere on earth. We will elaborate on this a little more in the next part of this article.
Above, we have linked the circle of existence to the proposition and the dark name as the proposition and the name for the proposition, taking into account only the forms in terms of propositions and the names that can be thought of as the inside of propositions and are closed to navigation. At this point, let us continue to explain the characteristics of ignorance by linking the distinction between the universe, nature and the universe mentioned in the previous article to this point.
The universe, as a sentence of things, is in the circle of becoming and decay in terms of its movement. In terms of its existence, the universe is called “existence”. This existence is made up of forms that are connected to each other. What can be navigated in terms of these forms are propositions; what cannot be navigated are names. Navigation in terms of propositions takes place in language. Therefore, existence in these meanings is in language. Language is a place of beholding, the form it beholds is propositions, and its beholding is intellectuality. In this sense, existence is in intellectuality. By intellectuality, we mean “thought” in a broad sense.
According to this, one who knows existence is one who knows the sentence of things or some of the things without knowing a name. Such a person’s knowledge is incomplete. Let us not be misunderstood, this incompleteness is not a deficiency, a deficiency that can be sensed by someone who deepens in knowing existence. On the contrary, the one who deepens and specializes in knowing existence begins to feel no deficiency. Because the form seen is light, and the darkness is somehow “hidden” within the form.
However, what is supposed to be seen in the light is the name. Because of this point, this person is the one who does not realize that he is actually looking at the darkness. How can he realize? He who looks into the darkness cannot see anything.
If the person who has been enlightened to know existence should feel this lack, he will also have a community that has all kinds of seduction mechanisms to distract him from this feeling and to lead him away from this “perverted dream”. Because this “(pseudo)-enlightenment” can only be realized through “belonging”.
But unfortunately, it is impossible for this person, however he manages, to look at existence and see even a single name, including his own name. Because of this impossibility, this person is actually in need of those who know names. Without going into how this need can be awakened in him, let us briefly explain how it is possible to know names from the point of view of nature, and remind you who and what this person is in need of.
We have stated in the previous article and in this article that one who knows the universe cannot see nature. Seeing nature depends on realizing the movement inherent in nature. This movement is the verb “open-close” as the verb of birth.
The act of opening and closing is the coming to life of a thing as its opening from the source of its origin, and its death as its entry into the source. In this sense, both life-giving and death-giving, as one and the same verb, is the verb of birth and beyond.
With a single act, opening and closing occurs; the one who opens enters the course and the one who closes exits the course.
Nature is constituted by this verb.
Opening with the verb birth does not constitute a temporal “moment”; and only temporal “moments”, i.e. chrono-history, are formed on the basis of the verb opening.
In this respect, the universe as evolving in the circle of becoming-disintegration is moment by moment leaning on nature as the circle of birth; by covering what it leans on, by raising itself above in the sense of “zihar”.
What comes into being with the act of birth is the name. The coming name spontaneously observes itself; through this observation, it knows a name and sees an adjective depending on the name; again, spontaneously.
If this name falls out of its nature and closes itself to the course, it comes into existence. The form that comes into being as a result of this closure, that is, the frame, is now language (logos as logia).
Because of this fall, the one who comes into being loses its name and the sentence of names.
However, this loss is not essentially a loss since the basis of its coming into being is birth. In fact, what is lost at this point is the fall itself.
The only and truest goal of this lost one in the circle of existence should be to find what he has lost.
In order to find what he has lost, he must find the name.
Finding the name depends on changing, that is, transforming, the name given to it when it came into existence.
The names given to it when it came into existence are, for example, names of family, race, culture, economics; or biological, physiological, evolutionary names; or religious and ideological names, and so on.
These names are dark names that are actually hidden from observation because they do not come with birth, but are not seen in the form of the proposition in the idea.
It is highly unlikely that the universe, that is, the being, can understand what the universe is, since it cannot yet see nature and therefore the name.
In spite of this remote possibility, it is He who wants to teach both the universe and nature their ultimate origin by sending messengers from among them to teach them His “Asma al-Husna”, i.e. His “Most Beautiful Names” in their own language, in order to explain to them their ultimate origin, and who wants them to be loyal to their own origin, not to anything else.
For this, He comes down to them, the fallen ones, as a “Friend”. By descending for the sake of the Friend, the place of descent is transformed into another place. This place is now a Garden of Friends, firmly established everywhere in the universe.
Thus, every kind of movement finds meaning again on the basis of the “Garden of Friends”; and a trace of this garden remains in the memory of every rememberer.
To be a friend is to be loyal.
With salât û salâm to Hakk Dost; enough of these “words”.
