“I gave thread to the weaver, he hasn’t made a ball of yarn
He keeps ordering it bec-by-bec, let him come and take his cloth”
Yunus Emre
In the previous articles, we explained the conceptions that emerge in the thought of the individual in the context of movement and mentioned the ideas of subject, realm and source, and thus showed that at the center of the conception of the individual is the conception of existence as the unity of these conceptions. Then, we divided the existence in question into the universe, nature and the cosmos from another perspective. In terms of this distinction, what is expressed by the concepts in question is fundamentally different from each other. In terms of this difference, the distinction in question is also based on the conception of the topography specific to the individual. In this respect, for example, the universe and nature are different, because the place of the universe in the topography of the individual is different from the place of nature in the topography of the individual; this is what is meant.
The concepts in question cannot be distinguished from each other simply by intellectualization (logia). The basis for the distinction is first to identify the individual as a topography and then to identify the object (objekt) specific to each place (topos) in that topography. Therefore, the conception of “individual, realm and source” depends on unpacking the concepts of “individual, realm and source” in terms of each place in the topography and distinguishing them from those in other places in terms of their “essence”. This distinction and differentiation is in order to arrive at the ultimate boundary of the conception of the individual as topography, so that there is no confusion between the ultimate boundary and what is “determined” in terms of the ordinary boundary, and then to recognize the actual source of what is determined in terms of the ordinary boundary.
For example, if the universe under the registration of the relation (ratio) is taken as the limit in terms of the object that the dreamer observes and measures on this basis, the dreamer would be based on an entity that is exclusive to itself. However, it is impossible for the imaginary to be based on an entity exclusive to itself. The dreamer is the formless name that perceives the object (objekt) under the registration of the discrete external scene and on the basis of relation (ratio). Therefore, this disjunction cannot even be considered as the source of the concept of “object” in the broad sense; similarly, perception on the basis of “relation” cannot be taken as the source of “perception” in the broad sense; and finally, because of the formless noun of imagination, one cannot find a source for the “name” in language on the basis of imagination; for these reasons. Without finding a source for the name in language, one cannot, for example, do science or philosophy. But more importantly, not finding a source for the name means leaving the existence of the individual in limbo. In other words, it means leaving oneself in limbo. In the “Establishment of the World” articles, we have already mentioned that in order to exist, one needs to be a “name”.
Mathematics, science, philosophy, theology, history, economics and similar institutions are all based on the existence of a name. Similarly, the functioning of these institutions on the basis of ratio is dependent on the formation of the relation on the basis of the noun. Using the relation cannot mean comprehension of the relation and knowledge of the sciences on the basis of the relation without opening up the principles of the organization of the relation.
The superior “use of relativity” that is characterized in Western thought does not mean that the principles of the formation of relativity have been opened and known. Some of the efforts of the culture in question, through the institutions of “philosophy” and “theology” for hundreds of years, to seek the constitutive basis of relativity are also attempts that constitute the chronological burden and nature of the institutions of “philosophy” and “theology”. Plato and Aristotle are at the forefront of these attempts, and it is within the framework of these two names that this essence acquires a determination. The concept that provides the aforementioned determination in terms of these two names is “Logos”.
In other words, if we open the concept of “logos” in terms of Plato and Aristotle, we begin to see the boundaries and grounds of Western culture’s efforts in relation to the concept in question.
The determination of philosophy and theology on the basis of the concept of “logos” under the burden of the above-mentioned burdens is also the reason why the source of nisbet cannot be opened. Because of this situation, what should be taken as a source for nisbet has remained incomplete in the “conceptions” that inform philosophy and theology, and this incompleteness has made the buildings built on it less “solid”.
By building here, we mean, for example, “Derrida’s philosophy”, “Husserl’s philosophy”, “Darwin’s philosophy-science” or “evolutionary theory”, “quantum mechanics” or “transcendental logic”, “dialectics” and similar intellectualities (logia).
The fact that the constitutive principles of relativity were “blind” in this way did not constitute an obstacle to the “use of relativity”. Progress by “using it without constituting the basis” has been mistaken for “development” and finally these shortcomings have been “overlooked”. The cultural structures called modern and post-modern, and finally the understandings guided by them, are products of leakage and violation, created on the basis of overlooking the aforementioned “deficiencies”. A leakage inspection that can be carried out at any time is sufficient to reveal the condition of the aforementioned structures. However, the success of such an inspection depends on recognizing and “fixing” the “problem” that makes the structure illegal; that is, in the context here, in the broad sense of “the constitutive principles of nisbet”.
The theoretical intellectuality provides the point of departure for the aforementioned inspection by placing the constitutive principles of nisbet “before our eyes (in thought)”.
This is why, in our previous article, we drew attention to “ism”. We have also stated above that the principles of the formation of the nisbah should be opened on the basis of the “name”.
Essentially, the formation of a relation is based on an original and formal name. The name in question comes as a simple form through genesis. For this reason, the basis of its formation is itself transcendent to the relation. The name in question, which comes through genesis, loses its form and falls, and the person begins to think on the basis of the formless name. This falling is also the differentiation of the “one world” into the “inner world” and the “outer world”. Philosophy and theology come after this “dissociation”; that is, they are thinking activities that can begin after the fall, essentially by realizing that the “inner and outer” are subject to different principles, as in Parmenides, Heraclitus and Plato.
However, this realization and the ensuing effort to dismantle it can be attributed to different conceptions in terms of unraveling the source of the distinct and finally giving a description of it, as can be seen in the aforementioned names. In the culture in question, it is Plato’s prerogative to analyze and envision the aforementioned issue on the basis of “name”. Later on, this conception was narrowed down to a different ground and spread by Aristotle to the culture that we can broadly call “Western philosophy and theology”; in an increasingly disgraced and ruined form,
In this sense, Western philosophy and theology can be read as the formless ism, that is, the fallen one, searching for the form of its own name and, after a certain point, even forgetting itself, that is, its being a formless name. What we mean by the inability to unravel the principles of relation is a matter closely related to this.
For, in fact, the formation of a relation depends on the birth of the “original ism” as a simple and internal form; otherwise, one would have to speak of the relation as a principle in its own right, which would be to deny the theory and the conception of substance that writes theory, as seen especially in Kant. Moreover, in order to see “where Western philosophers and theologians,” including Kant, stand at this point, it is necessary to understand some of the points that are necessary for taking the relation as a principle.
First of all, for a relation to be a principle, those who enter into the relation and the relations that constitute the relation must come from and exist on a basis that transcends the relation. Relation cannot be considered as a source in itself; it can only be constituted in terms of entities and the relations between entities; in this case, the issue must be opened in terms of the manner in which these entities and the relations between them are constituted. Moreover, these entities and their relations with each other must be constituted in terms of a “medium (middle) that provides unity,” which, similarly, cannot be grounded in the ultimate source of nisbāt. The formation of the middle is realized through those who come to the middle, and this is essentially how the relation is formed, with the essence of those who come to the middle being prior to the middle. In other words, it is not possible to talk about the relation and the mediate without finding the “source” of those who come to the relation and the mediate. One cannot talk about “rational cognition” without talking about relation and mediation. It is not possible to constitute the source in question on the basis of relation and mediation in itself, since the source must be of a different nature.
The source in question is the “formal name” that is constituted internally to the simple landscape and the “formal attribute” it bears internally. The source in question is constituted on the basis of non-relation, as the basis of relation. The constituted name and attribute are immanent, and this immanence is transcendental to the relation. Because we cannot call something internal and something external on the basis of relation. We cannot talk about “content, content, fullness” without constituting the interior itself, that is, the “interior place”; therefore, we cannot talk about the “internal course” either. Without being able to talk about its inner course, we cannot talk about, for example, spectrum, idea, eidos, begriff, concept and essence.
The simple landscape, which is formed on the basis of the aforementioned intimacy, unfolds through the description of the formless verb that is internal to the formal attribute, and thus the relative medium and relation are formed in a way that ensures the relation of the formal noun and pronoun. The relation in question is the “real relation” and its essence is the “simple view” that constitutes the “inner interiority” that is the “non-relation” through genesis.
Accordingly, a relation cannot be conceived as a basis without a non-relation. The external relation, in this respect, is constituted on the basis of the “simple landscape” that comes through “genesis” and the “formal name” that it “carries within”.
In other words, one cannot speak of “constituting a relation” without constituting a formal name. The point to be carefully understood here is this: Thought cannot constitute a formal name, and since it cannot, it lacks the “cognition” that is required on the basis of a formal name(s). It is for the understanding of these points that we mentioned the name as an issue in the previous article.
This series of articles is about the formation of ignorance and the formation of “jahiliyya” in terms of its “continuity”; then it is about the end of this “continuity” in terms of its “termination”. Here, the formation of ignorance must also be considered in conjunction with the concept of “creation”, in the sense of “that which is created” by “muhaddas”. In this respect, ignorance is, in fact, a “continuum” that is “created by the Muhdesat”, in the sense that it continues “in misguidance” and therefore “in nâr”.
In view of these last points, it is necessary to connect another issue to this series of articles, so that it will be possible for the article to move forward and to give completeness as it progresses. This issue is “time” and, on this basis, “history”.
Therefore, in this article, as a continuation of the previous articles, we briefly touch upon the issues of time and history. In the next article, we would like to explain, in terms of the concepts emphasized in this article, that the Prophet who destroyed the Jahiliyyah and His inexhaustible Sublime Works will not be dealt with in the context of “philosophy” and “theology” in the forms of “history” and “historicity”. In this context, we will touch upon the issue of history and historicity, which is rooted in Aristotle but “deepened” with Hegel.
In this way, we would like to remind them of the fact that the “theologians” in our country, whose “comprehension” is barren of imitation and destruction, do nothing more than engage in empty work with the concepts of “history and historicity”.
Similar statements apply to philosophers and theologians who entertain themselves with the concept of “universality”. It is possible to understand what is meant by considering the concept of “universality” in terms of the distinction of “universe, nature, cosmos” mentioned in previous articles.
As will be remembered from previous articles, we said that the parts of time as “unit(s)” cannot be considered as the source of the unit or part itself. Let us continue from there.
Time as successive units can only be thought of as a form, a form of succession. In this sense, for time to be fundamental in itself, it must be the source of its components as a unit. However, time’s being the source of its own units is contrary to the conceptions of “one” and “one’im”. Without being constituted on the basis of succession, “one” and “one’im” cannot be accepted as originating from time as the form of succession itself. Similarly, in order to be the form of succession, the concepts of form or shape or form must be constituted on the same basis. Then, the successive units must constitute “unity” on the basis of form; in this respect, the conception of “unity” must similarly originate from time as the form in question.
However, neither “one” and “my one” on this basis, nor form (form, shape), nor unity can be considered as constituted on the basis of time, that is, based on time. On the contrary, time can be conceived as subsequent to the formation of “one” and “unit”, the formation of “form” and the formation of “unity”. In other words, we cannot speak of the “one” without the formation of the “one” first, and when we cannot speak of the “one”, we cannot speak of the “successive units”, and then we cannot speak of the “form of succession” without the “unity of successive units”. In this respect, “one and unity” precede “unit” and “the form of successive ones”.
Succession requires thinking of “samiyyat” in terms of succession. That is, without ensuring that a unit remains the same as itself, it cannot be thought to be the successor or successor of another. This sameness is the essence that makes the unit a unit. That is, a unit can be perceived as a unit because it can remain the same with itself. In this respect, a unit has its own identity. In other words, in response to the question, who is it, it has its own essence through its aspect that remains the same with itself. In terms of its dependence on this basis, the unit has an identity; it is different from everything else.
However, in order for the unit in question to be successive with other things, it must have an aspect that enables its transition to other things. Otherwise, it would not be possible to find a face of “contact” from the thing in question, which has an identity, in such a way that it successively comes in contact with other things. In this case, it would be impossible to speak of “succession” and time.
This aspect in question is formed on the basis of the “abstraction” of the unique identity of the unit as one. Thus, the one, as a “unit”, “interacts” with things similar to itself.
We will go into this in more detail later.
The time in question, in this respect, is not an internal time in terms of the unique identity of the unit. On the contrary, it is (external) time as a projection of the “internal” time(s) of each unit in terms of its specific identity.
In this respect, it is out of the question to think of a thing as being included in an external time without its own time. In fact, time is constituted in the particular time of the thing seen as a unit.
The thing’s property of remaining the same with itself means that the thing has a time of its own, distinct from external time. If this were not the case, it would not be possible to speak of any thing. Let us rephrase, the thing exists because it can remain the same as itself; therefore, the thing has its own sphere of preservation, that is, a time in which it can be itself. This time, on the other hand, is not obtained from an external time before the thing. Otherwise, we would have to say that the existence principles of the thing, which can be thought of as an external time, are the thing itself. However, we have seen above that this is not possible. External time is not the essence of time that does not belong to the thing. On the contrary, we cannot think that this thing “participates” in external time without considering that it has its own time.
In this sense, the thing that has its own time is the “individual”. The individual does not acquire its own time from outside.
Similarly, we need to think of a basis for the individual’s own time. Similarly, the time proper to the individual is time as a form of succession. And what is essential for this time, too, is the aspect that ensures “sameness” in terms of what flows in time. Without this aspect of “samiyyat” in the individual, which enables the perception of time, there can be no perception of the flow of time. For this reason, the individual can perceive the flow through an aspect that remains the same with itself in the flow in its own time. If the aspect of “remaining the same” in question does not remain the same for each moment, it would be impossible to pass from one moment to another. The aspect that remains the same for each moment is the basis for the perception of what does not remain the same for each moment within moments; in other words, the perception of what differs for each moment is possible through a basis that remains the same for each moment.
Without these two aspects being valid at the same time, it is impossible to speak of an individual “perception of time”.
Here, the perception of what is different for each moment and what remains the same for each moment together is the perception of “change”. In other words, the perception of change is realized through the principles that ensure the perception of sameness and difference on one and the same basis; otherwise it is not possible to speak of change.
In this sense, it is not possible to talk about change, time and history without identifying the principles that ensure this perception in the individual and seeing which direction of perception those identified turn to.
Change, time and history are based on the principles that must be found in the individual and are meaningful in terms of these principles.
These principles are the “forces” inherent in the individual.
Without taking “force(s)” into account and examining the individual from this perspective, the above points cannot be concluded.
The issue of “force” is the most important issue that prevents seeing the individual as a simple unit, a part, a component. In order to see what kind of grave consequences an (intellectual) operation on this important wager can lead to, for example, to understand the current state of philosophy in Western culture, one can examine the “faculties” at the center of Kant’s “Transcendental Philosophy” and how he diminished them in different editions. For example, some of the failures caused by this important mistake in terms of the grounding of mathematical objects can be understood by examining Prof. Dr. Ahmet Ayhan Çitil’s book “Mathematics and Metaphysics”, and thus some of the main reasons for the current dilemmas of “mathematical thought” can be seen.
Despite the fact that mathematical objects cannot be established as objects, the “development” and “elaboration” realized through the use of mathematical objects is a “malfunction” of the same nature as the “expertise in the use of relation” without “actually constituting the relation” we mentioned at the beginning. The repair of such malfunctions depends on the availability of masters capable of detecting the malfunction and the repairability of the malfunction.
A defective structure leads to a defective use. And corrupt use results in the user becoming more and more like the thing he or she uses. In fact, this is the reason why philosophy has been going out of town since Kant. As such, the give-and-take game among a mass of “experts” who gather under the name of “science” but who are not curious about almost anything “fundamentally” looks like a “symposium” to outsiders. In reality, however, what is really going on is the long-standing creepiness of those who are afflicted with such malfunctions. In other words, the feast of the “experts” who are under the record of this malfunction and similar ones is a feast of reptiles. Let us return to the subject.
The issue of strength is the most important aspect in the formation of an individual. Without taking this into account, it is impossible to talk about the individual, time, change, or any of the related concepts in a sound way. A mistake about force leads to many unpredictable mistakes, and a restoration of it provides an outlet for resolving many seemingly disparate issues. So let us elaborate on this concept a little more, in order to elaborate a little more on the issue of sameness.
The way in which the individual can remain the same as itself depends on the individual’s ability to preserve itself against any external degradation. Similarly, the way for the individual to perceive something as the same as itself depends on preserving that thing from all kinds of external influences. However, the first of these is prior to the second.
He who cannot preserve himself cannot preserve other things. For this reason, the force of preservation must first be opened through the self-preservation of the individual.
The individual’s self-preservation means that he or she possesses the force that ensures preservation. The individual in this sense is the “individual with power” by possessing the power of self-preservation.
The “strong” is that which is based on itself; in other words, it is substance.
For this reason, the one who has the “power of preservation” should be referred to as “substance”.
A substance in this sense cannot be attached to a “relation”, that is, an “accident”. This is because the self-preserving substance cannot be “touched” by anything other than its own essentials.
Similarly, that which cannot “touch” the substance in question can neither measure it, weigh it, nor know it. In other words, it is not possible to assign “measure, proportion, comparison” to the substance in question. It is also not possible to assign a measure to such a thing on the basis of a “non-relation”.
The substance with power is in its own original world and cannot be considered subject to the measurements of either nisbet or non-relativity.
However, it is not possible to take the substance in terms of its preserving power alone as a basis for the concept of “change” and “time” as described above. We cannot think that substance in terms of its preserving power alone leads to the concepts of “change” and “time” as described above. However, we cannot think of these concepts without the “conservation force” either. And we cannot think that the basis that will be the basis of the concepts in question, in terms of “substance with force”, is “something other than force”.
At this stage, we need to find another force for the opening of the concepts in question. Moreover, the force in question must be “constitutive”. Because, in essence, change, in the above meanings, is realized through constitution.
This force, which belongs to the substance and is instrumental to constitution, is “imagination”.
Through the forces of preservation and imagination, substance preserves and constitutes what it preserves; similarly, we can say that it constitutes and preserves what it constitutes. In this respect, on the basis of the “unified” action of these two forces, substance engages in the activity of organization and conservation.
The activity of constituting and preserving is also the basis of the constituting of “moments” in terms of the unified action of the forces.
For this reason, “time as the succession of moments” emerges first of all depending on the constitution of the “moment”.
For the moment in question, a “before moment” and a “after moment” are unthinkable. The formation of the concepts of “before and after” is therefore dependent on the execution of the forces that constitute the “moment” itself.
In this respect, the “constituted moment” constituted through the exercise of force is prior to the “moment” considered in terms of the sequence of before and after. In other words, we cannot say that the “moment” constituted through the action of force is the “moment” in time. Because to speak of the moment in time is something that can be thought of as after the “succession of moments”. For these reasons, the “moment” based on “force” precedes the “moment in time” and is the basis of every moment in time. To think otherwise would cancel the idea of “force”. In the case of the annulment of the idea of force, the ideas of substance, samiyyat, identity, and preservation are also annulled, and the concepts of change and time, which are thought on the basis of these, become narrower and fall into obscurity.
This fall into limbo is the lifeblood for the “continuity of jahiliyya”. Therefore, one must be very careful at these points.
The concept of time, as briefly described above, is a concept that needs to be opened up in terms of several different aspects. The concept of “time” that is used without opening up these aspects is not considered in terms of its essence and is thought in a way other than the original.
One cannot speak of “history”, “historicity” and “historiography” on the basis of the concept of “time”, which is dealt with without opening up its essence, because one cannot speak of “constituting history”.
History, historicity and historiography depend on the making of history. And the making of history depends on the writing of time.
Without writing time, history cannot be written.
Writing time is essentially writing change through the exercise of power.
Change is change in terms of those who change and those who remain constant in change. One cannot talk about change without talking about those who change and those who remain constant in change. Without talking about change, as mentioned above, one cannot talk about time.
Writing time through the exercise of force is not analytical in the idea of thinking “time through the sequencing of moments”. Therefore, watching “time through the sequence of moments” and detecting differences in this time cannot be considered “the course of time” and on this basis “the course of history”.
The course of history depends on the course of time, and the course of time depends on the writing of time.
In this respect, history cannot be written without writing time.
Reading books, examining documents, reading archaeological remains cannot be considered as reading history for these reasons.
To rephrase, without reading history, one cannot talk about historicity, nor the idea of history.
The theoretical idea of theory is itself reading history, by opening its own ground.
In this respect, talking about history and historicity through intellectuality requires first of all the opening of “the intellectuality of theory” as the history of intellectuality. The talk of “history and historicity” through intellectualism by an “intellectualist” who cannot even open the theory cannot be accepted as a valid and general judgment about history in a broad sense, no matter what he has said or thought.
It is by no means possible for such a person to frame the Prophet and the Kalam, and the Great People as their inexhaustible Great Work. He cannot “touch” the Prophet, his Word and his inexhaustible Great Works, so that he can make a single “correct” judgment on these matters.
