At the Institute of World Economy and International Relations and the Higher School of Economics, Dmitry Trenin holds the positions of Lead Research Fellow and Research Professor. He belongs to the Russian International Affairs Council as well.
The Cuban missile crisis, which drove Moscow and Washington into a nuclear clash and threatened the immediate extinction of the planet, occurred 60 years ago this October.
Fortunately, the two leaders at the time, Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy, had the intelligence to pull away from the edge and then start working together to manage challenges in the nuclear age. There is hope that the lessons learned from the past can also assist to conclude the current situation in Ukraine on a peaceful note as it escalates into a direct military confrontation between Russia and the United States.
But we must also be aware of the significant distinctions between the two crises.
Acute sentiments of insecurity brought on by the extension of the opposing power’s political influence and military presence right to one’s own country’s doorstep—in the case of Cuba then, and Ukraine now—have been the apparent cause of both conflicts.
But this commonality is almost the extent of it. The significant aspect of the Ukraine conflict is the enormous disparity between the stakes at play and the relevant capabilities of Russia and the United States. The problem is basically existential to the Kremlin.
In essence, not just the future of Ukraine but also that of Russia itself is up for discussion. The matter is undoubtedly vital, but the White House sees it as less urgent. The US’s ability to lead the world (which will not be compromised by events in Ukraine), its credibility (which can be tarnished but scarcely lost), and the administration’s standing with the American people are all in doubt (for whom Ukraine is hardly a top concern).
Additionally, the conflict in Ukraine is viewed as a historic chance to beat Russia and destabilize it to the point where it can no longer be a threat to even its tiniest neighbors. There is a temptation to use nuclear weapons to permanently neutralize Russia, putting an end to the “Russian Question,” and possibly dividing it into several smaller nations that would fight among themselves. This would, among other things, deprive China of a significant ally and resource base, as well as create the right circumstances for Washington to triumph in its confrontation with Beijing, cementing its global hegemony for many more years.
In the event that nuclear weapons are used in the Ukraine conflict, the Western public is being prepared. Russian warnings to NATO nations to avoid direct involvement in the war, which are intended as deterrent rather than an intention to widen the conflict, are regarded as blackmail due to Moscow’s nuclear status. In fact, many Western experts predict that Russia will deploy its tactical nuclear weapons if its forces suffer a defeat in Ukraine.
Instead of viewing this as a tragedy that must be completely avoided, they appear to see it as a chance to punish Russia extremely hard, brand it a global outlaw, and pressure the Kremlin to totally submit. Practically speaking, the US’s nuclear posture and modernization initiatives.
This in no way implies that US President Joe Biden’s government favors a nuclear conflict with Russia. The issue is that its aggressive approach to Ukraine is based on the false assumptions that Russia can accept being “strategically defeated” and that, in the event of nuclear war, use of such weapons would be restricted to Ukraine or, at worst, to Europe. The practice of Americans attributing their own strategic rationale to their adversaries in Russia has a long history, but it can be gravely erroneous. While the US comes out of the fight uninjured, Moscow is unlikely to accept a scenario in which Ukraine, sections of Russia, and Europe are hit by nuclear strikes.
When President Vladimir Putin recently issued another warning to Washington, emphasizing that “it is not a bluff,” some people assumed that it was indeed a bluff because so many of Russia’s supposedly red lines have been crossed without consequence since the start of the Ukraine war. But as recent events show, Putin’s statements need to be taken more seriously. In an interview from 2018, he asked, “Why do we need a world without Russia?”
The issue is that “a world without Russia” would most likely be the end outcome of Washington’s strategic defeat of Moscow in Ukraine. This means that, God forbid, if the Kremlin encounters what its military doctrine refers to as “a threat to the life of the Russian Federation,” its nuclear missiles will likely point across the Atlantic rather than at some point in Europe.
This is a terrifying idea, yet it might be helpful. Not just the strategic use of nuclear weapons, but all uses of them, must be avoided. It is sad but true that the basis for peace between rivals is mutual dread rather than solemn promises and religious intentions. We began to refer to this as “mutually assured destruction” and deterrence. Our senses should not be compromised by fear, which should instead prevent it from paralyzing our will. On the other hand, we would be stumbling into serious problems if deterrence were to be undermined and dismissed as bluff.
Unfortunately, this is exactly the direction we are going. Given that Ukrainian forces are attempting to drive out the Russians who have taken control of the station, it is telling that Western public opinion, including the incredible European public opinion, has tolerated the constant shelling of Europe’s largest nuclear power station over a period of many weeks.
These are essentially the two lessons that may be taken away from the Cuban missile crisis. One is that putting nuclear deterrence to the test could have disastrous repercussions for all of humanity. The second is that understanding must prevail over winning on either side if a crisis between large nuclear powers is to be resolved.
Even though the time is running out and the space is getting less, there is still time and area for that. Even though it is still too early to talk about a possible resolution in Ukraine, those Russians and Americans who, like me, have spent the previous three decades trying in vain to forge a cooperation between their two nations must now join together to consider ways to prevent a catastrophic conflict. After all, it was casual human interaction that spared the globe in 1962.
