The Theosis of the World -III – On Man as Theomorphic and God as Anthropomorphic

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The Theosis of the World -III - On Man as Theomorphic and God as Anthropomorphic

“I went up to the plum branch, I ate the grape at once,
The orchard is warm and says, what would you eat my trump card”
Yunus Emre

Let us continue by remembering that the triadic conception that emerges in the concept of the individual is essentially the conception of the source for the individual and objects other than the individual.

For this, we must first consider the idea of source. Source is a Turkish word that means the place of origin, the cause, the spring, the beginning of something. For example, the place where a river or a stream starts is called a source. It is not possible to end the existence of something without cutting off its source or its contact with its source. In terms of beginning, cause, and ground, this concept is closely related to the issues pronounced as “substance”, “essence”, and “base”. With these meanings, this concept also touches upon the ideas established in classical texts in the context of words such as “osuia”, “subjekt”, and “hupostasis”. However, it should be noted here that this is more than a simple matter of translation or equivalent words, but a matter of importance that needs to be addressed in terms of the necessity of an activity related to thinking in Turkish. The word “source” somehow contains a conception of “movement” in terms of its connections with “boiling”, “flowing” and “source”. In other words, for example, it contains in its implication that the cause and ground of the “flow” in motion is the “source” as “kaynae”. Whereas, for example, “osuia”, in Greek, means “immaterial”, i.e. “non-transmissible”, and subjekt and hupostasis, which mean “underlying”, “underlying non-moving”, and which are considered in the broad sense of “substance”, “object”, and “being” theories with meanings close to these, are treated as the “underlying” basis of the object in motion. On the other hand, although “source” is the cause of “flow”, it expresses a different conception than the meaning of “standing” at the bottom or side. Because the source “boils”. Just like a spring. The flowing spring originates from somewhere, and the “frame” and “place” where the boiling begins is called the “eye”; both the eye of the spring and the back of the spring are the source of the spring. The source of the water in any part of the spring is this eye and its tail. In terms of the flowing spring, the source is fixed in terms of coming from somewhere, but it is not fixed in terms of itself. In other words, the spring is both fixed and not fixed. As in previous articles, we use the term “source” in this article by taking these meanings into account.

Consequently, as seen in this example, the congruence between the act and the perpetrator is not as simple as one might think.

There are many other important examples of the incompatibility of the act and the perpetrator in terms of the person. The psychological examples of these important examples include the fact that there may be other reasons behind the visible faces of ordinary actions such as a person attacking something in anger, fleeing from an action or environment, showing tolerance and love to a person, which the person is not even aware of. Opening the theoretical framework of these conflicts, which are evaluated in psychology and sought to be resolved with certain practices, in terms of psukhe is also important in terms of understanding how deep and sensitive these examples that can be handled in psychology are. However, we cannot go into these points in this article. We mention them in order to show the broad framework of the incompatibility of the act and the agent.

This is also the case in terms of the objects that a person perceives. For example, the motions of objects perceived through sensation, the motions of objects that are thought, or the motions of objects that are perceived in some other way, also have very dark closures in terms of their relation to their objects, contrary to what is customary. As we mentioned in the previous article, we use the concept of movement in a broad sense here. For example, just as we call the movement of a living being from one point to another, we also call the wilting of a flower, the death of a living being, the aging of a book, the breaking of a pencil movement. In this sense, movement means “change”. The birth of a living being, the germination of a seed, the fermentation of milk is also movement in this sense, that is, change.

The fact that objects undergo change leads to a question of “cause” in terms of knowing the object. The reason why the question of the cause does not arise while experiencing change is because the cause of the object subject to change is in sight or within the circle of knowledge. Therefore, someone who experiences the change of an object without the cause being clearly visible or known cannot take the change for granted. This is because change is always something extraordinary. What makes us forget that change is phenomenal is that we conceive of certain causes for changes. However, in cases where it is realized that the visible or known cause is not the primary cause of the change in question, the existence of the usual, visible and known causes cannot prevent the extraordinary awe-inspiring quality of change from surrounding the human being. The fact that we call this the original cause here is to emphasize the fact that what was previously known as the cause has lost its characteristic of being the cause, and that the cause has emerged as something other than what was known. Because the issue is to know the original, to find the original. Without knowing the original, the rest cannot be understood. The one who knows the real cause is the one who knows the real cause. The cause that is not the real cause is a deception. All of the discrepancies that arise in the individual’s conception are the ever-increasing problems of deep discrepancy due to the inability to open the source as a cause, and therefore, by falling for the apparent harmony. As long as the individual cannot open the source, he deceives himself and does not realize the true nature of the connections he realizes in his conception. This lack of realization is the greatest obstacle to the individual becoming an “individual”. As long as the individual does not recognize the problems in his/her conception of the individual and then resolve them, he/she cannot be an individual. And the individual who cannot be an individual cannot find and defend his right to exist. Because what does not find and know its rights does not exist.

The idea of God is in some way an idea of cause. For example, in polytheistic beliefs, expressions such as “god of lightning”, “god of love”, “god of wisdom” express the idea of a god as the cause or active agent of what is included in the phrase. In the idea of one God, there is only one God who is the cause of all perceived things. Similarly, the idea of god and divinity is conceived in many communities as the cause behind things that are perceived in some way. This is also the case in some philosophical and scientific approaches. For example, Aristotle, who had a very strong influence on the chronology of thought and belief, is known to have spoken of a god as “the unmoved mover”. Likewise, the idea of “Deus”, that is, God, which Spinoza defines as “itself, the cause of itself”, should also be mentioned in this context. However, for example, in objections to the ideas of god, the basis of the objection is formed through the connection of god as a “cause” with the “caused” thing. In other words, it is thought that there is no need to attribute the cause of what is perceived or thought to the idea of god, and thus the idea of god as a cause is opposed. Or arguments are developed both for and against the idea of God on the basis of certain problematics of “causality,” such as its logical pattern or the arbitrariness of the arrangements created by perceptions in experience. In classical theological disciplines as well as in modern cosmological proof attempts, the idea of God has been discussed in such a way as to be a “cause” in many respects, and many arguments have been made in this regard. The fact that the idea of God is somehow found as a “cause” in both religions, ideas, and beings in natural experience requires attention to the conception of “cause” when dealing with the idea of God. However, while determining the common conception of “cause” in all these differently oriented circles, one should not overlook the reasons for the differences or the attempts to harmonize them with each other when in fact they are not the same within the framework of this subject. We think that the most important issue that will eliminate the confusion at this point is the nature and possibility of the idea of “cause” and the fact that being a “cause” is determined according to the conception of the “thing caused”.

The statement “everything is God” is an enigma in terms of “everything”. That is, without understanding and explaining what “everything” is, God as “everything” is an empty statement. The “understanding” in this regard is important in terms of the person, while the “explanation” is important in terms of understanding what the speaker understands. Therefore, such statements can only be understood in terms of their context. It is not possible to lump the speakers of such statements together because of encountering a similar expression despite being expressed in different contexts. Because no statement carries a meaning without opening its context. Contrary to popular belief, unpacking the context of a statement is not completed by a simple textual and linguistic analysis. Because the ultimate context of the word is the person who owns that word. Without opening the person who utters the word, the context of the word cannot be opened. Consequently, without taking into account the alliance of all the theistic (deistic), atheistic and pantheistic discourses that have emerged on this issue in terms of not touching the main point, the real reason for the mistakes of those who raised these issues cannot be revealed. The reason for this state of affairs of those who agree on the error in this regard is the problem of “contact”. The “contact problem” is the most widespread and hidden ailment of the “theologian” (we use “theologian” here to include both priests and philosophers). It manifests itself in all kinds of ideas and religious practices. In terms of intellectualism, for example, these symptoms have manifested themselves throughout history in many major areas of intellectualism as a result of the suppression of the theory. In this respect, the texts written as the history of philosophy, thought and science are actually the history of symptoms. Only the theoreticians can see these symptoms.

The problem of contact is a problem of “contact with the source”. Now, let us briefly unpack this problem as a fundamental issue of the foundation of the world in terms of the connection between the person and God.

The desire to open the connection to the source begins with the fact that the source is not open, i.e. not available, to the one who wants to open the connection. The one who is clearly connected to the source does not need the source to open to him. However, the source is closed for the one who is not openly connected to the source but considers it the source of his actions. One does not need to open one’s connection to the source until one realizes that the things that one has in one’s possession and passes off as sources are not sources at all. Therefore, the one who wants to open the connection must first realize that he has no clear connection with the source. For such a person, the fact that the source is closed does not mean being cut off from the source in an absolute sense. Otherwise, the person would not exist. Therefore, even though the source is closed, it must somehow exist as an exit for the one who wants to open it. We call this state of being as an exit a “trace”, which also means “the end of the rope”. The person who wants to open the connection has to find a trace for this connection. But from this point on, the issue ceases to be a simple matter of belief and thought. Because the “trace” represents the one who left the trace in some way, in other words, it resembles the one who left the trace in some way, the contact of the one on whom the trace is left to the source that left the trace will enter a quality that will be opened through a similarity according to the nature of the trace. However, this similarity must also exist as a dissimilarity in essence in terms of the open source being closed. For the source in terms of the person in contact is not the person himself. If it were, there would be no need for conception. In other words, God, the Realm and Man would exist in person. However, this is not the case. In terms of the person in conception, none of the actions are clear in terms of their origin, that is, in terms of the source. For this reason, for the person who wants to find the source, the opposition of similarity and dissimilarity is simultaneously found as an ontological trace as a point of departure in a conflicting way in the individual who watches the act. This means the beginning of a heavy and careful journey for the tracer.

The obligation of humans to perceive the source they depict in whatever form through an analogy is important in terms of opening many anthropological issues in history in terms of their principles. It is a fact that the gods or gods and divinities resemble objects in nature or the anthropos themselves in the understanding of gods seen in primitive societies and mythologies. This is something that can also be seen in the Monotheistic Religions of Revelation. Because this is so, this fact has been the subject of much criticism with the characterization “anthropomorphic god”. However, while most of these criticisms try to resolve the issue by removing God from an anthropomorphic and cosmomorphic depiction of God, either to the unknowability of God or to the empty conclusion that God does not exist, they actually drag the issue into another knot. How is it possible for something that is in no way like something to be recognized by something? How is it possible to speak of two such things where there is an absolute separation between the thing and the unlike? On the other hand, if it is similar to things, how will the source, which is actually beyond the closed, be found as an exit for the one who wants to open the door, that is, how will the connection between them emerge? Obviously, when the individual assigns agents to actions, he or she does not see or know an actual source, but once he or she realizes that the assigned agents are imagination and conjecture, he or she must find the source specific to them; from this point on, this source must be identified in the individual as a trace in a similar and dissimilar way. Approaches that cancel dissimilarity at the expense of neglecting this demarcation point, and those that cancel similarity, are merely throwing away the workload. Moreover, for this reason, they also prevent a proper understanding of what human beings have produced in these matters throughout history. In both contexts, the characterization that has been used as a spell, as an insult, as a shame, in order to unpack the meanings of the similarity aspect in this regard is revealed as “anthropomorphy”. While many traces are destroyed by the use of this word, at the same time, the conception of “anthropomorphic source” in the negative sense of “anthropomorphic source” in the source conception of those who destroy these traces is skillfully overlooked. The first thing that needs to be done to understand this is to unpack this word, which is used like a scarecrow.

The word anthropomorphy is formed from the Greek words “anthropos” and “morphe”. Anthropos means human, human being; morpheme means form, shape, image. What is commonly meant by anthropomorphic is the idea of “in human form”, “in the form of a human being”. The negative use of this term in terms of the ideas of God begins with Xenophanes in the Greco-Latin-Church realm, and then continues to exist in the Greco-Latin-Church realm and in those who come into contact with the culture of this realm, like a police force in all kinds of ideas of God, covertly or overtly. Xenophanes criticized these depictions by saying that people likened their gods to themselves and posed the problem that “if it were, for example, horses talking about gods, the gods would also be like horses”. Although this criticism may seem justified at first glance, in itself, it has paved the way for a more serious objection than the one raised. In fact, before attributing a negative meaning to the word anthropomorphic in the idea of a god, the problems that need to be asked and resolved, if any, are what “anthropos” and “morpheus” are, not to destroy the possibility of connecting anthropos to the source through a trace such as morpheus and to sleep in the dream of a source that does not have an anthropomorphic aspect, whether it is called a god or something else. For if we do not call it anthropomorphic, then the assignment of sources that one likens to one’s own essence to the elements that emerge in the imagination emerges as another kind of anthropomorphism that is not in the discourse but actually occurs. This is because the “source” in the individual’s conception is already under the record of the individual’s conception of his or her own essence, regardless of its level and quality. In other words, as long as the individual is in the conception, no matter what level and quality it is, it necessarily contains the source in anthropomorphism under the record of its own essence. The real issue is not anthropomorphism, but what is the essence of the anthropos that gives the morpheme. No one should think that the idea of God, which Aristotle characterizes as “the unmoved mover,” is something other than its own essence, its own essence, which Aristotle describes as “the unmoved mover.” Nor should anyone think that Deus, Spinoza’s “causa sui”, i.e., his god, is anything other than similar to Spinoza’s own essence, i.e., his ground for establishing the world. Moreover, this is even clearer in the case of Spinoza. For according to Spinoza, this god, which he defines at the center of the ethica, which he proves in geometrical order, can only be connected to if the mind (mens) becomes active. This central name, which is called Deus and defined as “the cause of itself” and to which other things and the individual are connected on the basis of “mind”, is actually Spinoza himself. In the Ethica, Spinoza describes his own essence, which he ultimately constitutes as a mental structure, and the other things connected to it, as god, nature and man. From this point of view, for Spinoza, the essence of anthropos is the mind (mens) in such a way as to ensure the unity of these three concepts; therefore Deus, God, is similar to this mind (mens). In other words, the god Spinoza describes is anthropomorphic. The real issue here is not whether the god described is actually anthropomorphic, but whether the anthropos described is human; that is, whether the essence of the human being is mind. It is impossible for any Ethica addict to comprehend this point without being freed from the shackles of the Ethica. What makes this example crucial in this matter is the case of Spinoza’s criticism of the Torah in which he accuses the Prophets of being anthropomorphic. Spinoza attributes the basis of the criticism of anthropomorphism brought by the Prophet to the faculty of “imagination”. His salvation from this is “mind”. Opening up the issues of the faculty of imagination and the theoretical principles of the mind, he sees with great astonishment that what is being done here is nothing but turning things upside down. And he regrets with great sadness that this issue still affects and influences history in an extremely complex way, both in terms of its chronological burden and its conceptual meanings. In Xenophanes’ ministry, all kinds of disciplines that were treated with the words anthropos, morpheus, and theos took their share from this confusion created in the Greco-Latin-Church realm. It is difficult to correct this confusion in the Greek-Latin-Church realm. But there is hope for those lands that have come into contact with this culture and still have the opportunity to escape its influence. Let us return to the subject.

The term anthropomorphic is a concept that cannot be used positively or negatively in the ideas of man and God unless the meanings within them are unpacked both theoretically and logically. In fact, as briefly pointed out above, what is really anthropomorphic are the imaginations of those who define the Theos (Deus) on a basis that has nothing to do with the Theos itself. In terms of Anatolian Maya, it is not acceptable to define Theos on the basis of mens and to implicitly liken it to anthropos on the basis of mens. In this respect, Theos (Deus) is exclusive of a characterization such as that of Spinoza. Similarly, this exclusion extends to any conception that grounds the anthropos in a body of flesh and bones and a mind of thought, emotion and belief. Therefore, the morpheme of the anthropos based on mind and body cannot be related to God himself. It is similarly impossible for the anthropos based on mind and body to be Man based on the heart. It is possible for the anthropos to realize this by finding its heart by following the trace of its creation. This trace is silent as a heartache in the one who descends from the mother’s womb.


The Human on the basis of the heart is higher than the anthropos and the anthropomorphic theos, and is not under the registration of its boundaries, i.e. the world-establishment. Man in this sense is theomorphic. It is not possible for any anthropos to personally realize and understand this without reaching the heart. The Heart is reached through the Kalâm, that is, by being born into the Kalâm that is the Hatem in the Ancient Dem from Turkestan…

Peace be upon Allāme (The unreachable scholar) Yalçın Koç and all our Pīrāns.

خلق الله آدم على صورته

Ahmet Turan Esin

-He is interested in theology, mysticism and philosophy. He publishes his writings on He gives seminars and lectures.

-İlahiyat, tasavvuf ve felsefeyle ilgilenir. Yazılarını'da yayınlar. Seminer ve dersler verir.-